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1Summary
This paper presents European case law concerning state liability and provides an
overview of state liability law in Germany. Two German follow-up judgements of
preliminary ruling cases will illustrate the discrepancy between the rulings of the
ECJ and the judgements of the German courts. This discrepancy gives rise to a
critical analyses of
State liability rules on a European level developed mainly because of the problems
concerning the enforcement of directives. An effective remedy was needed in
order to stop Member States from neglecting their duties to enforce Community
law. The State liability rules, developed by the ECJ through case law did not only
ensure and strengthen individuals’ rights, they also closed a long-existing gap in
the area of efficient sanctioning of breaches of Community law. There are three
conditions under which liability arises under Community law. If a Member State
committed a breach of Community law whereby individuals suffer losses or injury,
they are entitled to reparation where the rule of Community law breached is
intended to confer rights upon them, the breach is sufficiently serious and there is
a direct causal link between the breach and the damage sustained by the
individuals.
The German rules and laws concerning state liability rules are rather confusing,
since they involve claims rooted in different fields of law. Main emphasis is drawn
to the concept of tortious governmental liability (Amsthaftung) according to § 839
BGB in combination with Art.34 GG, which has to be considered the correct and
only basis for enforcing Community state liability. A claim for damages under
German law thus requires that an official, i.e. a civil servant in the exercise of a
public office culpably breached an official duty he owed to a third party which
suffered harm as a consequence of his conduct.
The follow-up judgements concerning Brasserie du Pêcheur and Dillenkofer in
the German Courts will be presented in the third part of this paper. Before finally
discussing whether the German rules of state liability are compatible with EC law
concerning state liability, or whether a reform is needed, the relationship between
national courts and the ECJ, in particular concerning the preliminary ruling
procedure is analysed.
2Preface
Having studied European law intensively for a year at the university of Lund, I
became particularly interested in the field of state liability law. Many books and
articles have been written about this field of law, yet the issue of Member State
liability towards their citizens does not seem to have reached a satisfactory level
of enforcement and realisation. This is probably due to the lack of efficient
remedy rules as well as the refusal to codify conditions for state liability law,
which have so far only been developed through case law.
In analysing whether German state liability law is compatible with EC law, I hope
to contribute to the amount of literature in a positive way. Although, ten years
after Francovich, discussion about state liability have seem to silent down on a
European level, suggestions concerning the reform of German state liability law
are vividly discussed in Germany.
In writing this paper I was assisted by Peter Gjörtler, Director of the European
Institute in Denmark, whom I would like to thank for his support and ideas.
Furthermore I would also like to thank my parents for their support during this
year of my Master Studies in Sweden.
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41 Introduction
This paper focuses on a comparison of German law on state liability with
European state liability rules, as they have been developed through case law since
Francovich.
The paper is divided into three main parts. A short overview of procedural aspect
explaining when and how Member States can be held liable and which remedies
are available for the individual, as well as a description of the case law concerning
state liability under European Law is presented in the first part of this paper.
In order not to bore the reader with background information to well-known
cases, I have chosen to present this additional information in the most important
cases in the text of the footnotes. The case presentation involves well-known
cases like Francovich and Brasserie du Pêcheur, cases before the Francovich
judgement in order to show how state liability was dealt with before as well as
cases decided after the Brasserie judgement to show the development of case
law in the post-Francovich era.
The second part of this paper provides an on overview of German state liability
law. As the German state liability rules are very confusing, since they involve
claims rooted in different fields of law, the main emphasis of the presentation will
lie with those norms problematic within a European context, i.e. the concept of
tortious governmental liability (Amtshaftung). As the translation of German terms
is often likely to result in several possible expressions in English, I have chosen to
write the German term in brackets behind the translation in order to facilitate
understanding for those familiar with the German concepts.
A critical analysis of the follow-up judgements in the German Courts will be
presented in the third part of this paper. Before discussing whether the German
rules of state liability are compatible with EC law concerning state liability, or
whether a reform is needed, the relationship between national courts and the ECJ,
in particular concerning the preliminary ruling procedure is analysed.
Summing up the main arguments and points of this paper, I will finally draw a
conclusion concerning the question of where we stand – ten years after
Francovich.
52 State Liability under EC Law
It can be argued that it is largely due to problems concerning the enforcement of
directives, that state liability rules were developed. Member States were failing to
implement directives on time, thus a damages remedy was needed in order to
stop them from neglecting their duties1. State liability rules did not only ensure and
strengthen individuals’ rights, they also closed a long-existing gap in the area of
efficient sanctioning of breaches of Community law2.
Articles 226-228 ECT permit the Commission or a Member States to initiate
proceedings against a Member State in the Court of Justice. Until 1992, the
Treaty provisions provided no guidance as to the kinds of remedies available to
the Court of Justice in the context of an enforcement action under these Articles3.
2.1 Procedural Aspects
According to Art.226 and Art.227 ECT a Member State can be held liable for
failing to fulfil its obligation under the Treaty. The procedure under Art.226 ECT
is initiated by the Commission and more common than the procedure under
Art.227 ECT which is initiated by another Member State. Mainly for political
reasons and due to lack of conveyance mechanisms Member State abstain from
initiating a procedures against other Member States for breach of Community
law4.
When being held liable for breach of Community law, the Member State will have
to take all necessary measures to comply with the opinion of the Commission or
the judgement of the ECJ. If it fails to do so, fines or periodical penalty payments
can be imposed on the Member State as forms of sanctions. The power to
impose penalties on the Member States was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty
in 1993, today Art.228 (2) 2nd sentence ECT. Especially in the field of non-
implementation of Directives within the given time-limits, the imposition of high
fines has become a common procedure5. The Commission can also impose
indirect fines by setting off future contributions, i.e. if a country is entitled to some
kind of contribution, but is liable for a breach of EC law, the Commission can
refuse to pay that contribution against the fine to be paid by that State.
                                                
1 Steiner, ELRev 1993, pp.3,6 ; Lee, In Search for a Theory of State Liability in the European
Union, see Introduction
2 Deckert, pp. 203, 207, 208
3 Lee, Part I A 1
4 Rengeling, Middeke, Gellermann, p.35
5 Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-5047
6Apart from being subject to fines, Member State liable for having committed a
breach of EC Law will also have to pay damages whenever third parties are
involved. Damages can be claimed by natural and legal persons. But neither
Art.226 nor Art.227 ECT gives individuals a right to issue a claim against
Member States directly before the ECJ. Individuals can only issue a claim against
a Member State in the national courts of that Member State or write complaints
about the Members State’s failure to fulfil its obligation under the Treaty to the
Commission, hoping that the Commission will initiate proceedings against that
Member State under Art.226 ECT6. In case individuals issue the claim in a
national court, it is not necessary that the Member State’s failure is recognised in
a judgement by the ECJ. The national judge can of course refer the case to ECJ
for preliminary ruling, but he can also recognise the failure of the Member State
on his motion7. Liability is thus not dependant on the ECJ’s ruling.
As traditional means of enforcement, especially the procedure under Art.226
ECT were inefficient, possibility for individuals to claim their rights, which have
been violated due to the Member State’s breach of Community law (e.g. failure
to implement  Directives), can be regarded as an adequate means to ensure the
principle of full effectiveness of EC law8 as well as the principle of loyalty or
solidarity as established in Art.10 ECT9.
Once a Member State is held liable for a breach of Community law, it will have to
make good for the losses that occurred because of that breach of Community
law. As the Treaty does not deal with this question of damages, the kind and
amount of damages which have to be paid, is determined by national law10.
However the remedy system available under national law may not be less
effective nor discriminatory to towards the claimant, i.e. there has to be an
effective, non-discriminatory remedy available under the national legal system11.
As judicial protection of individuals against Member States is mainly found in case
law developed by the Court of Justice especially in the 1990’s12, I will in the
following discuss the most important cases dealing with the establishment of state
liability law.
                                                
6 Wils, pp.191,192
7 Schockweiler, p.115
8 Case 106/ 77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629
9 Schlemmer-Schulte & Ukrow, p.84
10 van Gerven, CMLRev 2000, pp.501, 505
11 Case 33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989, para.111
12 Caranta, pp. 703, 704
72.2 Case law prior to Francovich
The first case concerning state liability law was the Humblet case13, which was
already decided in 1960. The ECJ ruled that if it “finds that a legislative or
administrative measure adopted by the authorities of a Member State is contrary
to Community Law, [then] that state is obliged by virtue of Article 86 of the
ECSC Treaty to rescind the measure in question and to make reparation for any
unlawful consequences thereof”.
In 1973, in the case Commission v Italy14 the ECJ articulated the idea of
Member State liability again by ruling that “… a judgement by the Court under
Art.169 [now Art. 226] and 171 [now Art. 228] of the [EC] Treaty may be of
substantive interest as establishing the basis of a responsibility that a Member
State can incur as a result of its default, as regards other Member State, the
Community or private parties.”, but the concept of state liability was not further
developed until the Francovich judgement.
In the Rewe case15 the ECJ held that in the absence of Community rules, it is for
the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and
tribunal having jurisdiction, and to lay down procedural rules governing actions for
safeguarding individual rights deriving from Community law. Those rules should
not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of
equivalence) and they could not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult
the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness)16.
Before Francovich the ECJ thus relied on national laws or the protection of
Community rights in national courts subject to the requirements of equivalence
and effectiveness17. But although the ECJ had already noted in older case-law18
that if damage had been caused through an infringement of Community law the
state was liable to the injured party for the consequences in accordance with
national law on state liability, it did not establish clear  conditions under which a
state could be held liable. As neither explicit rules concerning Member State
liability nor rules concerning efficient remedies existed in the Treaty19, and
because the above mentioned cases did not provide a sufficient basis for
establishing clear conditions for Member State liability, it was thus of great
importance that the ECJ established the principle of state liability for damages
                                                
13 Case 6/60 Humblet v Belgium [1960] ECR 559; Jarvis, p. 366
14 Case 39/72 Commission v Italy [1973] ECR 101, para. 11
15 Case 33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989; Jarvis, p. 366
16 Case 199/82 San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595
17 Tridimas, p.303
18 Case 60/75 Russo [1976] ECR 45 para.8,9 Case 39/72 Commission v Italy [1973] ECR 101
para. 112
19 Möllers, pp.20, 21
8suffered by individuals through breach of Community law in the Francovich case
as well as in Brasserie du Pêcheur20.
2.3 The Francovich Case
In Francovich v Italy21 the ECJ for the first time addressed the question of state
liability for breach of Community law and its basis in EC law22. The ECJ held that
where a state had failed to implement an EC Directive it would be obliged to
compensate individuals for damage suffered as a result of its failure to implement
the Directive. The Court based its ruling on two arguments, namely to provide
effective protection for individuals’ Community rights, i.e. to ensure the full
effectiveness of Community law as well as the principle of loyalty according to
Art.10 (ex Art.5) ECT23.
In its first argument the Court’s claimed that national courts have an obligation to
ensure the protection of rights and that “the principle whereby a State must be
liable for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of
Community law for which the State can be held responsible is inherent in the
system of the [EC] Treaty”24. In circumstances where the full effectiveness of
Community rules required prior action on behalf of the state, for example by
implementing a directive and where without such action individuals are unable to
enforce rights conferred on them, the possibility for the individual to obtain
redress is indispensable25.
The Court’s second argument is based on Art.5 (now 10) ECT, according to
which “…Member States are required to take all appropriate measures, … to
ensure fulfilment of their obligation under Community law, [i.a.] …to nullify the
unlawful consequences of a breach of Community law”26. Although the Treaty did
not provide explicitly for Member State liability in damages, such liability was
necessary to ensure the full effectiveness of Community law.
2.3.1 The principle of liability
The Francovich case concerns a state’s liability for non-implementation of a
Directive. The ECJ does however not explicitly state in this ruling whether state
liability exists for all breaches of Community law, i.e. the Francovich case being
                                                
20 Kapteyn, VerLoren van Themaat, Gormley, p.564, 565
21 Cases C-6 & 9/90: Italy had failed to pass the necessary laws to implement Directive
80/987, which required Member States i.a. to provide a guarantee fund to ensure the
payment of employee’s arrears of wages in the event of their employer’s insolvency. The
claimants, who had been employed in a company which became insolvent, were seeking
arrears of salary following their employer’s insolvency. As the Directive would have given
employees a minimum level of financial protection, the applicants claimed damages for the
losses they had suffered as a consequence of the non-implementation of the Directive.
22 Francovich Follow-Up, Chapter: The Principle of State Liability
23 Tridimas, p. 301
24 Case C-6 & 9/90, Francovich, para 35
25 Case C-6 & 9/90, Francovich, para 34; Kapteyn, VerLoren van Themaat, Gormley, p.565
26 Case C-6 & 9/90, Francovich, para 36
9just an example for one kind of state liability or whether state liability only exists
with regard to non implementation of Directives. In cases of non-implementation
of Directives the state’s failure is undisputable.
2.3.2 Conditions for state liability
According to the ECJ the conditions of liability are dependant upon the “nature of
the infringement of Community law which gave rise to the damage”27. In cases
where the damage arose due to the Member State’s failure to implement a
directive, compensation would be granted if three prerequisites are fulfilled28. The
Directive must grant rights to individuals, the content of those rights must be
identifiable on the basis of the provisions of the Directive and there has to be a
causal link between the breach of the state’s obligation and the loss and damage
suffered by the parties affected29.
Where these three conditions are satisfied, individuals seeking compensation as a
result of activities and practices, which are inconsistent with EC Directives may
proceed directly against the state30. Responsibility for non-implementation of a
directive will thus lie with the state.
2.3.3 Consequences of the Francovich judgement
The most obvious consequence of the Francovich judgement is that in every
Member State national judges have to allow a claim for damages against the
Member State, if the above mentioned conditions are fulfilled31. Whether or not
the national legal system allows for such a claim is irrelevant. Within national laws
on civil liability a remedy system against the Member State must be made
available, but it will be left for each state to decide which courts will be competent
to deal with such claims and to determine the procedural aspects.
Furthermore the Francovich decision can be used as a means of considerable
power to claim damages against any state who has not implemented a directive
within the relevant time limit32. Reasons for non-implementation are irrelevant. The
threat of the availability of damages in these circumstances is meant to diminish the
problems of non-transposition of directives.
Obviously Member States can be in breach of Community law in various ways,
i.e. not only by non-transposition of a directive33. But whether or not the
                                                
27 Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich, para.38
28 Craig, LQR 1993, pp.595, 597; Steiner, EC Law, p.67
29 Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich, para. 40
30 Steiner, EC Law, p.67
31 Schockweiler, p.120
32 Craig, LQR 1993, pp.595, 601
33 Craig, LQR 1993, pp.595, 604
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Francovich principles apply to others breaches of Community law as well as to
legislative, administrative and judicial acts or omissions, was not decided until the
Brasserie du Pêcheur case and later cases.
2.4 Development since Francovich
Several cases have been decided by the ECJ concerning state liability since the
well-known judgement in the Francovich case. The presentation of cases is
limited to those which best illustrate the development in this area.
2.4.1 Brasserie du Pêcheur
In the case Brasserie du Pêcheur34 the ECJ ruled that the prohibition on imports
was a breach of Art.30 (now Art.28) ECT and could not be justified under
Art.36 (now Art.30) ECT by the need to protect public health. This was due to
the fact that the principle that goods lawfully produced and marketed in one
Member State could be lawfully introduced into another Member State had to be
obeyed35. And furthermore there was no scientific evidence justifying the
prohibition on additives because some of those additives prohibited under the
Beer Duty Act were even permitted on other products. Concerning the
prohibition on the marketing of the French beer under the designation “Bier” the
ECJ ruled that it was contrary to Art.30 (now Art.28 ECT) and could not be
justified by reference to the mandatory requirement of consumer protection, since
labelling would have resulted in sufficient protection.
The question raised in the case Brasserie du Pêcheur was whether state liability
also arises in case of damages suffered by individuals for breach of Community
law which does not result from a failure to implement a directive, but from an act
or omission on behalf of the legislator36. The Court took the view that liability can
be imposed irrespective of which organ of the state was responsible for the
breach37.
With regard to the question of state liability the ECJ ruled furthermore that “…
where a breach of Community law by a Member State is attributable to the
national legislature acting in a field in which it has a wide discretion to make
                                                
34 Case C-46/93 & Case C-48/93: The French brewery Brasserie du Pêcheur was not allowed
to import its beer into Germany because the beer, although lawfully produced in France did
not comply with the purity requirements of the German Beer Duty Act, as it contained
prohibited additives. The Commission initiated proceedings against Germany under Art.226
ECT for breach of Art.28 (ex Art.30) ECT. The German authorities had imposed two
prohibitions, namely a prohibition on imports of beer containing additives and a prohibition
to market the French beer under the designation “Bier”.
35 Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649
36 van Gerven, CMLRev 2000, pp.501, 510
37 Craig, LQR 1997, pp.67, 68; Case C-46/93 & Case C-48/93 Brasserie, para.32
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legislative choices, individuals suffering loss or injury thereby are entitled to
reparation where the rule of Community law breached is intended to confer rights
upon them, the breach is sufficiently serious and there is a direct causal link
between the breach and the damage sustained by the individuals.”38
As Art.30 (now Art.28) ECT referred rights on individuals the first condition was
satisfied in the present case. When determining whether the second condition, a
sufficiently serious breach was fulfilled, the ECJ listed the following factors which
should be taken into account: the clarity and precision of the rule breached, the
measure of discretion left to the national authorities, whether the infringement and
the damage caused was intentional or involuntary, whether any error of law was
excusable or inexcusable, the fact that the position taken by a Community
institutions may have contributed towards the omission and the adoption or
retention of national measures or practices contrary to Community law39. In
essence, in order to determine whether the breach was sufficiently serious, the
question of whether the state in question could have reasonably been expected to
realise that its acts or omissions were violating Community law, has to be
answered40.
In order to find out whether a sufficiently serious breach existed in the present
case, the ECJ distinguished between the prohibition on the marketing of the
French beer as “Bier” and the prohibition on the import of the French beer
containing additives. Whereas the prohibition on the designation “Bier amounted
to a sufficiently serious breach of law, the prohibition on imports did not41. This is
due to the fact that the first prohibition was difficult to excuse, because the
inconsistency with Art.30 (now Art.28 ECT) had been established by earlier ECJ
decisions42. Thus, a breach of Community law will be sufficiently serious if it has
persisted despite a judgement of the Court which established the infringement in
question. Prior case law concerning the second prohibition was non existent and
the other factors mentioned above were not fulfilled either, so that this prohibition
did not amount to a sufficiently serious breach.
Apart from those statements concerning the establishment of a sufficiently serious
breach, the ECJ moreover confirmed that fault on the part of public officials is not
required and that the type of damage recoverable and the time-limits to recover
damages were established by the laws of the Member States and could be limited
provided that reparation was not made impossible or excessively difficult to
obtain43.  As according to German laws reparation depended on proof that the
passing of the offending law was referable to a particular third party, which made
obtaining of compensation practically impossible, since the task of the legislature
                                                
38 Case C-46/93 & Case C-48/93 Brasserie, para.74
39 Case C-46/93 & Case C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 56-57
40 Deards, p.620, 622
41 Deards, p.620, 622
42 for example: Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649
43 Deards, p.620, 622
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generally related to the public at large, this German rule should therefore be set
aside in cases of a breach of Community law44.
2.4.2 Other judgements concerning state liability
In the case R v Her Majesty’s Treasury, ex parte British Telecommmuni-
cations45, which was decided shortly after Brasserie du Pêcheur the ECJ ruled
that no sufficiently serious beach of Community law exists, although the Directive
in question had been improperly implemented. The ECJ reasoned his ruling by
arguing that an Article of the Directive was imprecisely worded. Moreover the
UK’s “…interpretation [of that Article], which was also shared by other Member
States, was not manifestly contrary to the wording of the Directive or to the
objective pursued by it”46 and was hence given in good faith. As no guidance was
available to the UK from case law as to the interpretation of the provision at issue
and since the provisions of the Directive were sufficiently unclear, UK’s error was
rendered excusable47.
Accordingly, when transposing a directive imprecisely but in good faith into
national law, a Member State cannot be regarded as having committed a
sufficiently serious breach of Community law.
In the case Hedley Lomas48 the Court held that a “Member State [the UK]  has
an obligation to make reparation for the damage caused to an individual by a
refusal to issue an export licence in breach of Art.34 of the [EC] Treaty where the
rule of Community law infringed is intended to confer rights on individuals, the
breach is sufficiently serious and there is a causal link between the breach and the
damage sustained by the individuals”49. As the Spanish authorities had
implemented Directive 74/577, but simply did not make any provisions
concerning the monitoring or the sanctioning of non-compliance with the aims of
the Directive, the UK ban on export of animals to Spain was in breach of Art.34
                                                
44 Deards, p.620, 622
45 Case C-392/93: The case concerned the improper implementation of Directive 90/351.
British Telecommunications claims to suffer financial disadvantages due to the wrongful
implementation and claims damages. The Directive enables contracting entities to exclude
themselves from the requirement it lays down, under notification of the Commission. The
UK however itself decided which operators are excluded from the Directive, through
Regulations. British Telecommunications argued that it was thus deprived of a rights
conferred to it by the Directive.
46 Case C-392/93 British Telecommunications, para.43
47 Steiner, EC Law, p.70
48 Case C-5/94: Hedley Lomas, an exporter claimed damages for losses suffered as a result of
a UK ban on the export of live sheep to Spain, which was imposed because Spanish
slaughterhouses did not comply with requirements on the stunning of animals before
slaughter according to Directive 74/577.
49 Case C-5/94, Hedley Lomas, para.32
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(now 29) ECT and could not be justified under Art.36 (now 30) ECT50. This
breach constituted a sufficiently serious breach and thus resulted in state liability.
The ECJ stated that “Where … [a] Member State… was not called upon to
make any legislative choices and had… reduced, or even no, discretion, the mere
infringement of Community law may be sufficient to establish the existence of a
sufficiently serious breach”51. This ruling became known as the principle of liability
for a mere infringement.
The principle of liability for a mere infringement of Community law was invoked
again by the ECJ in Dillenkofer 52. The ECJ ruled that “…failure to take any
measure to transpose a directive in order to achieve the result it prescribes within
the period laid down for that purpose constitutes per se a serious breach of
Community law and consequently gives rise to a right of reparation for individuals
suffering injury if the result prescribed by the directive entails the grant to
individuals of rights whose contents are identifiable and a causal link exists
between the breach of the State’s obligation and the loss and damage suffered”53.
The ECJ also held that concerning the relationship of the conditions for state
liability laid down in Francovich and those in Brasserie du Pêcheur, the two
sets of conditions can be regarded the same in substance, as “the condition that
there should be a sufficiently serious breach, although not expressly mentioned in
Francovich was nevertheless evident from the circumstances of that case.”54
The Denkavit55 case involved claims for damages resulting from a faulty and
imprecise implementation of Directive 90/435/EEC56. The ECJ ruled that
Germany’s failure was excusable for the same reasons as in the above mentioned
case British Telecommmunications. Thus the breach of Community law was not
sufficiently serious and did therefore not justify liability.
The principles developed in Francovich, Brasserie, British
Telecommunications, Hedley Lomas and Dillenkofer concerning state liability
                                                
50 Steiner, EC Law, p.72
51 Case C-5/94, Hedley Lomas, para.28
52 Cases C-178, 179 and 188-190/94: This case deals with concerned a reference for
preliminary ruling concerns the Package Travel Directive (90/314/EEC). The purpose of that
Directive was to protect the purchaser of package travel, by providing sufficient security for
refund of money and repatriation of the consumer in the event of the tour organiser’s
insolvency. Mr. Dillenkofer who had bought such a package travel could not commence his
journey because the tour organizer became insolvent.
53 Cases C-178, 179 and 188-190/94, Dillenkofer, para.29
54 Cases C-178, 179 and 188-190/94, Dillenkofer, para.23
55 Cases C-283/94, C-291 and C-292/94: This case concerns a tax law matter, namely a claim
for loss of interest, where the parent and subsidiary company are based in different states.
56 Steiner, EC Law, p.72
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are repeated in the Sutton57 case. The ECJ emphasises that it is up to the
national courts to assess the amount of damage, provided that national law does
not treat breaches of EC law less favourable than similar domestic claims
(principle of equivalence) nor makes it virtually impossible or excessively difficult
to obtain reparation (principle of effectiveness). Not only the amount of damages
is thus a matter of national law, but also what type of damage should be
compensated is to be decided by national courts. This ruling is almost contrary to
the judgement Brasserie du Pêcheur where the ECJ held that loss of profits was
a necessary component of the damages58.
The principle of liability for a mere infringement of Community law in situations in
which the Member States are not required to make any legislative choices was
again invoked in the Norbrook Laboratories59 case. Regarding the requirement
of a sufficiently serious breach the Court stated that such a breach exists, in the
exercise of legislative powers, where such powers are manifestly and gravely
disregarded and in the situation without or with limited discretion, “the mere
infringement of Community law may be sufficient to establish the existence of a
sufficiently serious breach“60. Concerning the third liability issues (the causal
connection between the breach and the damage) and the further conditions for
liability (in particular heads and quantum of damages), the ECJ pointed out that
they are to be determined by the applicable national law (and courts), albeit in
conformity with the well-known Rewe criteria61.
In the case Brinkmann Tabakfabriken v Skatteministerit62 (1996) the ECJ
found that the failure of Danish authorities to properly implement Directive 79/30
did not amount to a sufficiently serious breach. The erroneous classification of the
product gave no rise to liability.
                                                
57 Case C-66/95: The case deals with a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Directive
79/7/EEC on equal treatment of men and women in social security. The case concerns
calculation of interest on arrears of benefits. Ms Sutton claims compensation calculated as
interest due to late payment.
58 Francovich Follow-Up, Chapter: Post-Francovich Judgements by the ECJ
59 Case C-127/95: This case involves a claim for damages for faulty implementation of EC
Directives on the marketing authorisation of veterinary medicinal products. The questions
concerned the liability of a Member State where the authorities require information of the
company which is incompatible with Directives 81/851 and 81/852. The Court ruled that
certain information concerning the origin and the like of relevant components of the
medicine could not be required from the undertaking, whereas certain other data with
respect to the production process - in the interests of public health - could be required of
the manufacturer.
60 Francovich Follow-Up, Chapter: Post-Francovich Judgements by the ECJ; Case C-127/95,
Norbrook Laboratories, para. 109
61 Case 33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989, para.111
62 Case C-319/96: This case deals with the erroneous classification by the Danish authorities
of a tobacco product manufactured by Brinkmann under Directive 79/32/EEC. The applicant
was a German company which produced a tobacco product. In Germany that product was
taxed as smoking tobacco, but the Danish authorities taxed it at a higher rate than cigarettes
when it was imported into Denmark.
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Those articles of the relevant Directive, containing definitions of ”cigarettes” and
”smoking tobacco”, were improperly transposed, as no definitions had been
adopted in Danish law at all63. Although the definitions in the Directive did not
corresponded exactly to Brinkmann’s product, he had to pay higher rates of taxes
for the cigarette roles he imported. According to the ECJ the way the Danish
authorities interpreted these definitions in the Directive was not manifestly contrary
to the wording nor the aim of the Directive, because it could be regarded as being
”open to a number of perfectly tenable interpretations” 64.
The ECJ finally decided the question of liability on the basis of causation.
Although the Directive had not been implemented in Denmark, the Danish
authorities nonetheless had applied the definitions of the Directive and had thereby
given immediate, but imperfect effect to its provisions65. Therefore there was no
direct causal connection between the legislative failure of the authorities and
Brinkmann’s damage. The ECJ accordingly held that a Member State whose
authorities, erroneously classified a product is not bound by Community law to
compensate the manufacturer for the damage sustained by the latter as a result of
that erroneous decision66.
The case Konle v Austria 67 deals with the assessment of the criterion of a
sufficiently serious breach of Community law. The ECJ held that, in principle, it is
a matter for the national courts to apply the principles governing State liability for
breach of EC law, in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Court in
previous case law68.
Concerning the liability within a federal State, the judgment does not provide any
clear guidance as to the question whether, as a matter of Community law, local or
regional authorities are liable for implementation errors regarding directives.
However, a joint liability of both of both a decentralized authority and the State in
the event of a breach of EC law by the former does not seem to be required69.
                                                
63 Francovich Follow-Up, Chapter: Post-Francovich Judgements by the ECJ
64 Case C-319/96, Brinkmann, para.32
65 Tridimas, pp. 301, 305; Steiner, EC Law, p.74
66 Case C-319/96, Brinkmann, para.33
67 Case C-302/97: Mr Konle, a German national sought to acquire land in Tyrol, but was
refused authorisation pursuant to the Tyrol Law on the Transfer of Land of 1993. As a
condition for the granting of authorization, the prospective acquirer had to prove that the
land would not be used for the purposes of establishing a secondary residence. The refusal
was later annulled on the ground that the 1993 Law was unconstitutional. Mr Konle brought
an action for State liability in damages on the ground that the Tyrol Law infringed
Community law.
68 Case C-302/97 Konle, para 58
69 Francovich Follow-Up, Chapter: Post-Francovich Judgements by the ECJ; Case C-302/97
Konle, para 63
16
In Rechberger and Others v Austria70 the ECJ found that Austria’s way of
implementing Directive 90/314/EEC failed to provide the level of consumer
protection provided by the Directive. Austria’s implementing Act applied only to
package tours taking place after 1 May 1995. But the Directive, included a
consumer guarantee and had to apply to all contracts concluded after 1 January
1995, i.e. the end of the transposition period. According to the Austrian law
consumers could thus only file claims at a date a few months after the time-limit
for implementation of the Directive71. The Court ruled that the Directive does not
allow Member States to reduce or limit the effect of the consumer guarantees
envisaged by the Directive. The incorrect implementation of one important norm
constitutes a sufficiently serious breach of Community law, according to the
Court72, and it is immaterial that Austria had taken measures with respect to other
provisions of the Directive, because it failed to secure the consumers’ guarantee in
issue .
According to this judgement the non-transposition of one relevant provision of a
Directive into national law within the time-limits can constitute a sufficiently serious
breach of Community law.
In Haim v Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein (Haim II)73 the ECJ
had to deal with a similar question as in Konle, namely whether a constitutionally
independent body may be liable under Community law, next to the Member
State, for a breach of primary EC law. It ruled that liability extended to public-law
bodies as well as to the Member States themselves. Secondly the ECJ states that
in order for the right to reparation to arise, a sufficiently serious breach of
Community law needs to exist74. If at the time of the infringement the state had
considerably reduced discretion or none at all, the mere infringement of EC law
                                                
70 Case C-140/97: The offer of holiday trip at reduced price from an Austrian newspaper to its
subscribers was more popular than expected and finally lead to travel organiser’s
insolvency. The plaintiffs, subscribers who had taken part in the newspaper offer and had
paid the travel costs in advance, brought an action against Austria, claiming that they
suffered losses due to the Austria’s failure to implement the Package Travel Directive 90/314
fully.
71 Steiner, EC Law p.74
72 Case C-140/97, Rechberger, para.53
73 Case C-424/97: This case concerns the refusal of the Association of Dental Practitioners
of Social Security Schemes to enrol the Italian national, Mr Haim, on a social security
register of dental practitioners. His diploma was not awarded by a Member State but by
Turkey, but it had been recognised in Belgium as equivalent to the relevant dental
qualification in that country. However the German authority subjected him to the
requirement of an additional training period, a condition not applicable to those with a
recognisable Community qualification. Although Mr. Haim was registered following the
ECJ's Haim I judgment (Case C-319/92, [1994] ECR I-425), he contended to have suffered
loss of income during a six year period for which he sought compensation. Under German
law, there is no liability according to the national court as the authority had acted in good
faith.
74 compare Case C-5/94, Hedley Lomas, para 25
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might suffice to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach75. The
existence and scope of that discretion were to be determined by reference to
Community and not national law, so that the degree of discretion conferred by
national law on the official or institution responsible for the breach of Community
law was irrelevant in that respect76. Other factors that were material to the
question of seriousness of the breach included whether the error of law was
excusable. In that respect it was important that, although Art.52 had been directly
applicable since long before the facts in the case arose, the decision in
Vlassopoulou had only been given in 1991, after the decision of the German
authority in 1988 to deny registration of Mr. Haim. Thirdly, the ECJ ruled that a
member state could make certain public dental appointments conditional on the
applicant having a sufficient knowledge of that state’s language.
2.4.3 Discussion
With its Francovich ruling the ECJ has created a remedy under Community law
enforceable by individuals in their national courts against defaults of Members
States, regardless of whether national procedural obstacles exist77. This creation
has however been subject to substantive criticism concerning the question
whether the ECJ has exceeded its powers by formulating such a remedy under
Community law78. The ECJ argued that although no explicit remedy rule
enforceable by individuals could be found within the Treaty, the principle of state
liability was nonetheless inherent in the Treaty79.
A substantive legal basis of liability and its required conditions were established in
the so-called first generation of cases80 after Francovich81. In Brasserie du
Pêcheur the ECJ argued that due to the fundamental requirement of the
Community legal order that Community law must be applied uniformly, the
principle of State liability is applicable to all organs of the State, including the
legislature82. Liability can thus arise as a result of action by the legislature, the
administration or the judiciary. This case also established the universality of a right
to reparation as well as the requirement of a serious breach83. In order to define
                                                
75 compare Case C-5/94, Hedley Lomas, para 28
76 Case C-424/97, Haim II, para.40
77 Ross, p.55
78 Möllers, pp.20, 22; Schlemmer-Schulte & Ukrow, pp. 82, 90; Deckert, pp.203,204;
Gellermann, pp.343, 352, 353
79 The reasons for that are described above.
80 First generation of cases: Brasserie du Pêcheur, British Telecommunications, Dillenkofer,
Denkavit, Hedley Lomas
81 Tridimas, pp.301, 302
82 van Gerven, Of rights, remedies and procedures, pp.501,505; Case C-46/93 & Case C-48/93,
Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 33
83 Case C-46/93 & Case C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 32
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the requirement of a serious breach several factors need to be taken into account,
as established in Brasserie du Pêcheur84.
As it has been established through case law, non-transposition of a directive will
per se amounts to a serious breach of Community law (Dillenkofer), whereas
misapplication of a directive does not necessarily give rise to liability (British
Telecommunications, Denkavit, Hedley Lomas)85. Thus if  there is no clear
guidance from a Directive, if the interpretation of it is neither untenable nor in bad
faith and if other Member States and the Commission even share the same view
then the misapplication of a Directive does not amount to a sufficiently serious
breach of EC law.
A breach of Community rules is more likely to be serious, if the discretion is left to
national authorities as was established in the case Hedley Lomas. By contrast, in
cases where the Member State has no discretion, it will be held strictly liable for
breaches of Community law86. Conditions which establish a serious breach do not
demand the existence of fraud, in order to prevent the differing application,
interpretations and understandings of that concept within the various national legal
systems87.
The second generation cases88 on state liability focuses on the requirement of a
serious breach, a causal relationship and the question which authority is
responsible to pay reparation, however they do not contain any innovations, but
concentrate on developing and refining the remedy89. Overall the ECJ seems to
leave more discretion to the national courts, but the determining criterion remains,
namely that the individual must have an effective opportunity to protect his rights
deriving from Community law. Hence the ECJ will strike down national rules
which prevent effective access to remedial protection90.
As with legislative acts, existing national remedies may need to be modified to
ensure that they are effective in protecting individuals’ rights. A principle of liability
or judicial acts in breach of Community law, as laid down in Brasserie du
Pêcheur clearly breaks new constitutional ground inmost Member States91.
                                                
84 Case C-46/93 & Case C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 56-57
85 Betlem, see Chapter: The Ius Commune Regime
86 Betlem, see Chapter: The Ius Commune Regime
87 Kopp, p.646
88 Second generation of cases: Norbrook Laboratories, Brinkmann Tabakfabriken, Konle,
Rechberger, Haim II
89 Tridimas, p.301
90 Biondi, pp.1271 ff; Tridimas, p.304
91 Steiner, EC Law, p.458
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3 German Law of State Liability
The German law on state liability is basically derived from two concepts, namely
on the one hand from the concept of tortious governmental liability,
(Amtshaftung) and on the other hand from the concept of encroachment
(Aufopferung) and expropriation (Enteignung)92.
3.1 Encroachment and exproriation
The concept of encroachment and expropriation is of minor importance for in the
European context. However it is mentioned in the reasoning of one of the follow-
up judgements discussed below and thus a short explanation of this concept will
be required.
According to the principle of expropriation and sacrificial encroachment, which
derive from §§ 74 and 75 of the Introduction to the Prussian General Land
Law93, the state is bound to compensate for the deprivation of private rights and
assets94. Compensation for expropriation and sacrificial encroachment is awarded
in cases of lawful, as well as unlawful, state activities. This claim is not based on
fault on the part of the acting person95. Whereas sacrificial encroachment refers to
immaterial rights such as health and physical integrity, quasi-expropriatory
encroachment relates to rights and assets96. The most important element of a
claim based on quasi-expropriatory encroachment is the special sacrifice of the
citizen concerned, which has to go beyond the scope of what all citizens have to
face and which therefore has to be compensated97.
3.2 Tortious Governmental Liability
Tortious governmental liability refers to the German term Amtshaftung which
relates to the claim under § 839 in connection with Article 34 GG. The concept of
tortious governmental liability, i.e. liability for unlawful acts committed by a public
authority, has its origin in the law of torts. The German law of torts is embodied in
the German Civil Code (BGB98), consisting of thirty successive articles
                                                
92 The material primarily used in this Chapter is Rüfner, Basic Elements of German Law on
State Liability p.249 – 274; Surma , A Comparative Study of the English and German Judicial
Approach to the Liability of Public Bodies in Negligence (Part I); Schlechtriem, Civil Liablity
for Economic Loss
93 see Supplement B, Badura, pp.283-288, 285
94 Rüfner, p.260
95 Ekkehart, § 41 III g bb
96 Badura, pp.283-288, 286
97 Rüfner, p.263
98 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch
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(paragraphs §§ 823 ff.), which can be found in the second book of the Code as
part of the law of obligations99. § 823 BGB, the first and most important German
tort provisions, does not include any limitation, but generally does not apply in the
same way to private persons and public authorities or their employees performing
public functions100. Regarding public liability there is a special claim for breach of
official duty which is established in § 839 BGB in conjunction with Article 34 of
the German Constitution (GG101)102.
3.2.1 § 839 BGB
According to  § 839 (1) an official is liable for any damage resulting from a
violation of an official obligation which he owes to a third party, committed
intentionally or negligently. In case the official can be blamed merely for
negligence he can be sued only if the injured party is unable to obtain
compensation elsewhere.103
§ 839 served as an all-encompassing means of protection against governmental
unlawfulness104. However originally the first section of § 839 imposes liability for
breach of official duty only on the official acting on behalf of the public body and
not on the public body itself105.  Thus the success of the claim, which had to be
directed against the official personally,  depended on his ability to pay. This
unsatisfactory result led to the fact that today the state or the public body in
whose service the official is, becomes liable for the official by virtue of Art.34
GG106.
3.2.2 Art. 34 GG
Art. 34 GG107 introduced a general liability of the state and its various
administrative units and bodies, such as the Federal Republic, the Länder,
counties and cities, for any damage caused by their employees acting in the
course of their public obligations and violating their so-called official duty
(Amtspflichten), i.e. duties of the state and its organisations towards its
citizens108.
                                                
99 Surma, text after note 117; Markesinis, The German Law of Obligations – Volume II The
Law of Torts: A Comparative Introduction (3rd edition, 1997)
100 Surma, text after footnote 124
101 Grundgesetz
102 Surma, text after note 125
103 see Supplement A
104 Rüfner, pp.250, 251
105 Surma, text after note 133
106 Rüfner, p.251
107 see Supplement B
108 Schlechtriem, Civil Liabilty for Economic Loss, http://www.jura.uni-
freiburg.de/ipr1/LB_BRIST.pdf
21
3.3 Elements of a claim under § 839 in
combination with Art.34 GG
A claim for damages under § 839 (1) BGB and Art.34 GG requires that an
official, i.e. a civil servant in the exercise of a public office culpably breached an
official duty he owed to a third party which suffered harm as a consequence of his
conduct109. The elements of a claim under § 839 BGB and Art.34 GG thus
require: (1) an official (Beamter), (2) acting in exercise of a public office (in
Ausübung seines Amtes, nicht nur bei Gelegenheit), (3) a breach of official
duty (Verletzung einer Amtspflicht), (4) a duty owed to a third party
(drittbezogene Amstpflicht), (5) fault (Verschulden), (6) causation (Kausalität)
and (7) damages (Schaden).
3.3.1 The meaning of “official”
When the German Civil Code was enacted in 1900 the wording of § 839 BGB
imposed personal tortious liability of civil servants110. § 839 applied only to
Beamte in a strict sense, i.e. governmental employees with a formal civil-service
status.
Art. 34 GG introduced a general liability of the state and its various administrative
units and bodies (such as the Federal Republic, the Länder, the counties and
cities). Today ‘official’ refers to any person acting in a public law capacity, not
only those who have civil service status but also employees and workers, or even
persons who have been authorised to act in a public law capacity by a public
authority without any contract of employment (officers or agents: beliehener
Unternehmer)111.
According to the wording of Art. 34 GG ‘any person’ who is performing
functions which are part of the sovereign activities of the public body not only
including its employees but also private enterprises or private individuals, can be
regarded as ‘an official’. Hence not the legal position or status of the acting
person is decisive for the liability of the public body, but the nature of the
activity112.
3.3.2 Acting in exercise of a public office
The official has to act in exercise of his public office. This element is satisfied
whenever an act is based on a statute which expressly designates a certain duty as
                                                
109 Surma, text after note 143
110 Schlechtriem, I.4
111 Rüfner, pp. 253, 254
112 Surma, text after note 145
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an official duty in the exercise of a public office113. The exercise of a public office
generally encompasses any kind of sovereign conduct. Activities which pursue
public duties or functions with public law means can be referred to as
sovereign114.
Furthermore, it is necessary that there is a special connection between the public
duty pursued and the tortious conduct115. The connection must be so close that
the physical act can be regarded as part of the sovereign activity of the public
body116. The requirement of ‘in the exercise’ is for example not fulfilled, when the
official acts purely out of personal motives117.
3.3.3 Breach of an official duty
Official duties are defined as the personal behavioural duties (Verhaltens-
pflichten) of the official with regard to the exercise of his office118. When defining
official duty it is important to refer to the duty which the official owes to his
employer, i.e. the state and not to the duties which the state has towards the
citizen119. Thus, official duties constitute internal duties the official owes to the
public body as his employee and not to third parties120.
As long as the official has to follow orders of his superiors, he cannot be in breach
of an official duty, i.e. when injustice is done to the citizen in such a case, it is the
conduct of the superior which needs to be examined121.
As there is no conclusive list of official duties either in § 839 BGB or in Art.34
GG, the courts were forced to create official duties via case law. The  main
official duty, deriving from Art. 20 III GG, is the duty to act lawfully122.
The official duty to act lawfully also encompasses the duty to exercise discretion
in a proper and lawful manner without arbitrariness123. Where the official acts
within the ambit of his discretion, liability will not occur. Incorrect application of
discretion will however result in a breach of official duty, even if it did not amount
to evident abuse124. An official could for example apply its discretion incorrectly
                                                
113 BGH NJW 1981, pp. 2120, 2121
114 BGH NJW 1992, p.972
115 OLG Köln NJW 1970, p. 1322
116 Surma, text after note 153
117 OLG Köln NJW 1970, pp. 1322, 1324
118 Surma, text after note 156
119 Rüfner pp. 249, 254
120 Surma, text after note 156 and 157
121 Rüfner, pp. 249, 254
122 BGHZ 16, pp. 111, 113; BGHZ 60, pp. 112, 117, Surma, text after note 162
123 Rüfner, pp.249, 255; BGHZ 74, pp. 144, 156; BGHZ 75, pp. 120, 124; BGHZ 118, pp. 263, 271
124 BGHZ 74, pp. 144, 156; BGHZ 75, pp. 120,124
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by exceeding it, by not applying it at all, but not realising that his discretion was
limited and by simply applying it wrongly.
Other examples of official duties recognised to fall within § 839 BGB and Art. 34
GG are the duty to act proportionally125, the duty to act without delay126, to act
consistently127, the duty to provide correct information128, and especially the
duties not to commit tortious acts129 and to comply with the public law duties to
maintain safety (öffentlich-rechtliche Verkehrssicher-ungspflichten)130.
3.3.4 Duty owed to a third party
The official duty must be owed towards a third party, i.e. the plaintiff, which is the
case if the official duty exists in the interest of a limited group of people worthy of
protection and not only in the interest of the community as a whole131. A statute is
intended for the protection of others if it exists to defend not only general but also
or solely individual interests132.
Official duties of officials are laid down in laws and other legal provisions. General
or individual orders can also establish official duties133. In order for an official duty
to exist three conditions have to be fulfilled. The official duty must generally be
capable of including individual protection134. The plaintiff has to belong to the
class of people protected by the duty and, finally, the damage suffered must fall
within the protective scope of the duty 135.
Due to these vague conditions an imposition of liability on the public body should
in principle only be justified when the official duty establishes a close proximate
relationship between the plaintiff and the public body136. Such a connection is
however not required where the public conduct breaches the official duty not to
commit tortious acts and directly violates interests of the plaintiff enumerated in §
823 I BGB, which are of an absolute nature towards everybody137. In such
circumstances the affected plaintiff is always a third person within the meaning of
§ 839 I BGB138. The requirement of a relationship between the plaintiff and the
public body is in theory intended as a means to limit the liability of public bodies,
                                                
125 BGH NJW 1973 p. 894
126 BGHZ 30, pp. 19, 26, BGH NVwZ 1994, p. 405
127 BGH NJW 1963, pp. 644, 645, BGH NVwZ 1986 pp. 245, 246
128 BGH NJW 1992, pp. 1230, 1231; NJW 1994, pp. 2087, 2090
129 BGH NJW 1992, p. 1310
130 Surma, text after note 172
131 BGHZ 65, pp. 196, 198; BGHZ 74, pp. 144, 146, Surma, text after note 178 and 179
132 Surma, text after note 123
133 Rüfner, p.254
134 Surma, text after note 182
135 BGH NJW 1992, pp. 1230, 1231
136 BGH NJW 1989, p. 99
137 Surma, text after note 186
138 BGHZ 69, pp. 128, 138; BGHZ 78, pp. 274, 279
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because not all cases in which an official breaches an official duty involve a duty
owed towards a third party.
3.3.5 Fault
As a tort-law provision, § 839 requires fault on behalf of the acting official139.
Thus § 839 I 1 BGB imposes liability only if the official has wilfully or negligently
breached the official duty140. In case of an intended breach of the official duty on
behalf of the official the requirement of fault is without doubt satisfied and § 839 I
1 BGB applies, i.e. the official will be held liable for the breach.
In the case of negligent conduct § 839 I 2 BGB will apply and lead to an
exclusion of the liability of the official or public body if the injured party can obtain
compensation otherwise141. § 276 I 2 BGB provides a legal definition of the term
negligence, which subdivided into light, ordinary and gross negligence. The
required standard of care is objective (Verobjektivierung des Verschuldens),
i.e. decisive is what standard could be expected from the average official who
was acting in compliance with his duties142. Furthermore, the plaintiff does not
need to name or individualise the particular official who acted and fell below the
necessary standard of care in order to succeed (Entindividualisierung).
If the behaviour of the official is considered to be lawful by a court, the official
cannot be regarded as having acted in a culpable way, even though the Court’s
judgement might be wrong143. Moreover an official applying unconstitutional law
does so in most cases act without fault144.
3.3.6 Causation
Causation is to established according to the theory of equivalence or rule of
conditio sine qua non. This rule requires that the damage would not have
occurred without the breach of official duty145. Moreover the causal connection
between damage and breach of duty has to be adequate. A causal connection is
not adequate if according to objective human experience and common opinion it
cannot reasonably be taken into account146. If, according to the concept of
alternative lawful conduct, the damage would have occurred even in case of
                                                
139 Rüfner, pp.249, 257
140 Surma, text after note 191
141 Surma, text after note 191
142 Rüfner, pp. 249, 257
143 BGH NVwZ 2000, 1206
144 BGH NJW 1984, 168; BGH NJW 1986, 2954
145 Surma, text after note 196
146 Surma, text after note 197
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lawful conduct of the official, the breach of duty is generally not regarded as being
a sufficient cause of the damage147.
3.3.7 Damages
According to § 839 I 1 BGB in conjunction with Art. 34 GG the public body is
liable for any damage arising from the unlawful conduct of the official148. The only
condition is that the suffered damage represents the kind of loss that the official
duty was supposed to prevent149.
The assessment of damages is determined by the general rules in §§ 249 et seq.,
§§ 842 et seq. BGB. Public liability does generally only lead to monetary
compensation.150. Apart from pecuniary losses, compensation for non-pecuniary
losses may be claimed for pain and suffering in cases of personal injury,
deprivation of personal liberty and severe infringement of someone’s general right
of personality on the basis of §§ 839, 847, 253 BGB, Art. 34 GG151.
                                                
147 BGHZ 96, pp. 157,171, Surma, text after note 199
148 Markensinis, The German Law of Obligations – Volume II The Law of Torts: A
Comparative Introduction, 3rd edition, 1997, p.903
149 Surma, text after note 202; OLG Oldenburg, NVwZ-RR 1993, 593
150 BGH NJW 1993, pp. 1799, 1800; BGHZ 34, pp.99, 104-105
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4 EC Law – German Law
Since Francovich until today four cases were brought before the ECJ concerning
the German rules on state liability. Those cases are Brasserie du Pêcheur,
Dillenkofer, Denkavit and Haim II. In this part of my paper I will describe and
analyse the judgements of those cases decided by the German Courts after the
ECJ had given its ruling. Furthermore I will discuss whether those follow-up
judgments are compatible with EC law and EC principles.
4.1 Follow-up judgements of the ECJ’s ruling
before German Courts
4.1.1 Brasserie
In the case Brasserie du Pêcheur the ECJ stated that there exist a sufficiently
serious breach, hence Germany is to be held liable for its breach of EC law.
However concerning the claim of the brewery based on German law the
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) rejected a claim for damages filed by the brewery
Brasserie du Pêcheur against Germany and held in his follow-up judgement152 that
neither tortious governmental liability nor quasi-expropriatory encroachment (or
expropriation-like intrusion, enteignungs-gleicher Eingriff) would give rise for
compensation153.
The BGH argued that tortious governmental liability did not arise under domestic
law, because the failure to amend the Beer Duty Act to comply with Community
law was not referable to any particular third party154. Secondly, the BGH also
denied liability in respect of an infringement equivalent to expropriation, because
domestic law did not apply in this area and, in any event, no such infringement
existed on the facts155.
Thirdly, under Community law the BGH held that regarding the two types of
wrongs the Federal Republic of Germany in one situation did not commit a
sufficiently serious breach whereas in the other no direct causal connection
between the loss suffered and the breach of Community law could be
                                                
152 Bundesgerichtshof , III ZR 127/91, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 1996,
761, Brasserie du Pêcheur; CMLR 1997, 971; BGHZ 134, 30
153 Puder, p.327
154 Deards, pp. 620, 622
155 Deards, pp. 620, 622
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established156. Therefore the Federal Republic of Germany was not to be held
liable according to the BGH.
Concerning the prohibition on the designation “Bier” (second situation), the ECJ
ruled that this rule amounted to a sufficiently serious breach, due to its
incompatibility with Community law, which Germany should have been aware of
because of earlier judgements. This prohibition however did not cause any loss to
Brasserie du Pêcheur, as no proceedings had been taken against the brewery by
the German authorities in respect of this rule157. According to the German law of
causation a necessary and sufficient causation between the prohibition and the
occurred damage must be given. In applying the German rules of causation the
BGH relied on the Francovich judgement in which the ECJ stated that it was “ a
matter for Member States to implement the conditions for liability as regards
‘direct causation’ into national law while safeguarding the full effectiveness of
Community law.”158 It was however not because of the prohibition to use the term
“Bier” on its products that the brewery suffered losses. The BGH thus denied the
existence of a direct causal connection on the ground that the prohibition on the
marketing of the French beer as “Bier”, did not cause the loss suffered by
Brasserie du Pêcheur.
The losses occurred due to the proceedings under the Beer Duty Act related to
the prohibition on imports (first situation). But regarding this prohibition the ECJ
had ruled that it did not amount to a sufficiently serious breach of Art.30 (now
Art.28 ECT)159. Although this prohibition caused loss to Brasserie du Pêcheur it
was insufficient to give rise to liability on the part of the German state. Concerning
the non-existence of a sufficiently serious breach the BGH simply argued that
even the ECJ did not regard the import prohibition of beer containing additives as
a sufficiently serious breach.
4.1.2 Dillenkofer
In the follow-up judgement160 of the Dillenkofer case, the Federal Republic of
Germany was not held liable by the Oberlandesgericht (OLG) Köln for the non-
implementation of the Package Travel Directive by Germany, because in this case
the relevant contract regarding the trip was concluded before the end of the
transposition period161. The ECJ delivered its judgement on 8th October 1996 as
discussed above.
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159 Concerning the reasons please see presentation of the case above.
160 OLG Köln, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 1998, 95, Dillenkofer
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On 15th July 1997 the OLG Köln162 ruled that Art.7 of Directive 90/314 on
package travel, package holidays and package tours provides that the tour
organiser to the contract is to provide sufficient evidence of security for the refund
of money paid over by the consumer in the event of the organiser’s insolvency.
However, Art.7 of the Directive does not provide an answer to the question
whether the organiser also has to provide sufficient evidence of security for refund
of money for contracts which were conducted before 1st January 1993.
According to Art.9 of the Directive, the Member States should have adopted all
the measures necessary to ensure that, as from 1st January 1993, individuals
would have effective protection against the risk of the insolvency of the organizer.
A law guaranteeing the protection of purchasers of package travel who entered
into contract with the tour operator after 1st January 1993 would have thus
ensured the transposition of the Directive. This also follows from the ECJ’s ruling
in para.50 and 51 of the Dillenkofer case, where it states that “it must therefore
be held that, in order to ensure full implementation of Article 7 of the Directive,
the Member States should have adopted, within the prescribed period, all the
measures necessary to provide purchasers of package travel with a guarantee
that, as from 1 January 1993, they would be refunded money paid over and be
repatriated in the event of the organizer’s insolvency. It follows that Article 7
would not have been fully implemented if, within the prescribed period, the
national legislature had done no more than adopt the necessary legal framework
for requiring organizers by law to provide sufficient evidence of security”.
However the ECJ however does not give an answer to the question whether
protection shall be only be granted for contracts being conducted after that date
or also in cases where the beginning of journey will take place after 1st January
1993.
The OLG argues that if protection would also be granted in cases where the
contract has been conducted before 1st January 1993, but the journey does not
commence until after that date, the law-making body would have interfered in
already existing contracts in an unlawful manner. Reciprocal contracts are legally
and economically identified through the fact that the relationship between
performance (Leistung) and consideration (Gegen-leistung) are established. A
change of this relationship due to a change in law in favour of one party to the
contract is only acceptable under exceptional circumstances and compelling
reason. The transposition of the Directive leads to an increase in cost on behalf of
the organiser, who must have been given the opportunity to calculate this increase
into the prices for the package travel. This possibility does not exist, if the above
mentioned protection would also be granted in relation to those contract which
had been conducted before 1st January 1993. According to the OLG it cannot be
concluded from Art.9 of the Directive that this disadvantageous result was
intended by the Directive.
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The OLG ruled that the claimant is therefore not entitled to damages, although the
start of his journey would have been after the expiration of the transposition date,
but because the relevant contract was concluded before the end of the
transposition period. Although the ECJ had stated that in this case there is a
sufficiently serious breach of Community law, which would result in an entitlement
to damages, the claimant did not receive any kind of compensation under German
law.
4.1.3 Denkavit
In the Denkavit case the ECJ itself states that there is no sufficiently serious
breach. Therefore there is no liability under EC law. Hence in this case there is no
state liability under German law either. This case does therefore not allow for
intensive discussion.
4.1.4 Haim
In Haim II the ECJ held that in order to establish the existence of a sufficiently
serious breach account must be taken of the extent of the discretion enjoyed by
the Member State concerned. The existence and scope of that discretion must be
determined by reference to Community law and not by reference to national
law163.
Whereas under German state liability rules, the elements of a claim for damages
under § 839 in combination with Art.34 GG include an element of fraud, the ECJ
in his judgement expressly stated that the obligation to make reparation for loss or
damage caused to individuals cannot depend upon a condition based on any
concept of fault going beyond that of a sufficiently serious breach of Community
law164.
The national court asked whether the mere fact that the official lacked discretion
in applying the faulty domestic law already constitutes a sufficiently serious
breach. The ECJ ruled that “The discretion referred to in paragraph 38 above is
that enjoyed by the Member State concerned. Its existence and its scope are
determined by reference to Community law and not by reference to national law.
The discretion which may be conferred by national law on the official or the
institution responsible for the breach of Community law is therefore irrelevant in
this respect.”165
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Furthermore the ECJ stated that determining whether and when a mere
infringement by a Member State will amount to a sufficiently serious breach is up
to the national court to decide by taking into account that the violated norm in
question, Art. 43 (ex Art.52) ECT, is directly effective.
Thus in a follow-up judgement166 the German court would have to determine
whether the breach by the German was sufficiently serious. In any case, the
judgement of the national court will not be contrary to the ECJ’s ruling, as the
latter did not rule upon the issue of a sufficiently serious breach. Therefore this
case won’t give rise to intensive discussion either.
4.2 Conflicting judgements
With regard to the Brasserie du Pêcheur and the Dillenkofer follow-up
judgements, it can be concluded that whereas the ECJ clearly ruled in favour of a
liability of the German State, the German national courts’ ruling awarded no
compensation to the claimants at all. How is it possible that German courts can
give an opposite ruling to the ECJ? Are these follow-up judgements in conformity
with European law?
4.2.1 Relationship between National Courts and the ECJ
The relationship between the national courts and the Court of Justice in
proceedings under Art. 234 ECT is co-operative rather than hierarchical, since a
reference to the ECJ cannot be regarded as an appeal against the decision of the
national court167. The proceedings can be described as a form of dialogue
between the Court of Justice and the referring court.
The Court of Justice cannot rule on matters that are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the national court in proceedings under Art. 234 ECT. For
example, it can neither rule on the application of the law to the specific facts of the
case before the national court nor on the compatibility of a provision of national
law with the requirements of Community law.
The Court of Justice is supposed to provide guidance on the correct interpretation
of Community law. However, the existence of the right to ask the Court of Justice
for a preliminary ruling does not deprive national courts and tribunals of the right
to reach their own conclusions on questions of Community law.
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4.2.2 Premilminary ruling procedure
The preliminary ruling under Art. 234 procedure plays a central part in the
development and enforcement of EC law168. The purpose of Art. 234 is to
facilitate and ensure the harmonization of Community law. It enables any question
of EC law to be referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling by any national court
or tribunal169, which considers a decision on the question necessary to enable it to
give judgement.
Where a question is raised concerning interpretation in a case pending before a
court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decision there is no judicial
remedy under national law, that court or tribunal has a duty to bring the matter
before the Court of Justice. For all other courts, referral is discretionary.
Regarding the second paragraph of Art. 234 ECT, courts and tribunals in the
Member States whose decisions are subject to a judicial remedy under national
law enjoy a discretionary jurisdiction.
Generally the Court of Justice has encouraged national courts to refer questions
for preliminary rulings in order to allow a harmonized application of Community
law. In a few cases it has refused jurisdiction, as the function of the Art. 234 ECT
was to contribute to the administration of justice in the Member States, and not to
give advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions170.
The matters that are referred to the Court of Justice are left entirely to the
discretion of the national judge. However the questions referred must be
“objectively required” by the national courts as “necessary to enable that court to
give judgement” in proceedings before it as required under Art. 234 (2) ECT171.
The national courts are allowed to formulate the questions they refer however
they want to. There are no requirements imposed. If the questions are
inappropriately phrased the Court of Justice will merely reformulate them,
answering what it considers to be the relevant issues. It may even interpret what it
regards as the relevant issues even if the referring court does not raise them.172
The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the extent that it has no jurisdiction to
interpret domestic law or to judge on the compatibility of domestic law with the
EC law. Furthermore, the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to rule on the
application of Community law by national courts. However it has to provide the
national court with practical or worthwhile rulings, since the application of
Community law often raises problems for national courts.  The preliminary ruling
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procedure also plays an important role for individuals, since they can only claim
their rights before a national court, which then might decide to seek guidance from
the ECJ173.
4.2.3 Effects of a ruling of the ECJ
A ruling under Art. 234 EC from the Court of Justice is “binding on the national
courts as to the interpretation of the Community provisions and acts in
question”174. The referring court is thus under a duty to give full effect to the
provisions of Community law as the Court of Justice interprets them. This may
sometimes require the national court to refuse to apply conflicting provisions of
national law.
Obviously it was possible for the BGH to disobey the ruling of the ECJ in the
Brasserie du Pêcheur case without being sanctioned for it. This is due the fact
that the BGH judgement could not be appealed by the claimant, as the BGH is
the highest German court within a civil procedure. The claimant could not raise the
matter before the ECJ of its own motion either, because on the one hand such a
right does not exist under the EC Treaty175 and on the other hand the ECJ is not
regarded as an appeal court to the BGH. Moreover the ECJ’s jurisdiction
depends “solely on the existence of a request from the national court”176, hence it
could not raise the matter on its own motion either.
4.3 Reforming German state liability law?
Some authors argue that the rules concerning state liability law in Germany are too
complicated and thus need to be reformed177. Taking into account that those rules
derive from several sources of law, I generally agree to those reform suggestions.
Nevertheless I would like to add that not only need the German state liability law
be reformed due to the reason mentioned, but also because of the difficulties
encountered concerning the conformity with EC rules. Especially the case
Brasserie du Pêcheur and Dillenkofer showed that German courts are able to
avoid state liability, although national courts are in principle obliged to follow the
ECJ’s ruling. Whereas the ECJ clearly announced Germany’s liability towards the
claimant, the national court denied liability and awarded no recovery of the
damages faced by the applicant.
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Due to the principle of direct effect and the principle of supremacy of law, there is
a duty to interpret national law on state liability according to the criteria
established by the ECJ in its case law. Consequently the German law has to be
adapted as follows.
4.3.1 Tortiuos governmental liablity
Although the principle of expropriation and sacrificial encroachment can fill the
gap that § 839 BGB leaves open, as it is not based on fault, § 839 in conjunction
with Art. 34 GG has to be considered the correct and only basis for enforcing
Community state liability178. With regard to liability of public bodies for breach of
official duty in a European context the following elements (1) duty owed to a third
party and (2) fault have to be modified.
4.3.1.1 The criterion of the official duty owed to a third party
In the case of a legislative wrong, i.e. a legislative failure to act (legislatives
Unrecht) the requirement that the official duty breached should be referable to a
third party (Drittbezogenheit) is normally absent179. Under German law the duties
of the legislator are not regarded as duties owed to a third party, as there is no
close proximate relationship between the plaintiff and the public body180. German
courts are however bound to the interpretation of the ECJ concerning the
requirement of a duty owed to a third party according to Community law. If the
ECJ rules that the duty to implement directives according to Art.249 (3) ECT
confers rights to a certain group of people, the national courts can’t argues that
the law implementing the directive is directed at the public at large.
A legislative failure to act occurs in the event of an omission on part of the
legislature to amend an act which is in conflict with Community law. The
legislature normally does not create law concerning any individuals or class of
individuals, but its tasks normally relate to the public at large and concern the
common good181. If reparation depended upon the legislature’s act or omission
being referable to an individual situation, that condition would make it in practice
impossible or extremely difficult to obtain effective reparation for loss or damage
resulting from breach of  Community law. Germany’s argument that such a
limitation on the availability of damages also applies to breaches of higher-ranking
national provisions, such as provisions of the German Basic Constitutional Law, is
not a valid justification182.
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The criterion of the official duty owed to a third party does therefore always exist
whenever an individual right under Community law claims an action or omission of
the executive or legislative body of the Member States183. Acts or omissions of
the national judiciary could also lead to a breach of the official duty owed to a
third party, if for example a national court breaches its duty to ask for preliminary
ruling under Art.234 ECT. This duty to ask for preliminary ruling is based on the
individual right of a fair trial which is guaranteed by the German Constitution
according to Art.101 (1) 2nd sentence GG184.
4.3.1.2 The criterion of fault
As discussed above the ECJ in Brasserie du Pêcheur explicitly stated that the
criterion of fault on the part of public officials is not required. Thus Germany can’t
argue that because a claim under § 839 BGB in combination with Art.34 GG
requires the existence of fraud, compensation will not be available due to negligent
behaviour on behalf of the official. Whether or not the official acted intentionally
or negligent is of no interest for a claim concerning damages due to tortious
governmental liability. The criterion under German state liability law must thus
either be set aside or interpreted in the light of Community law.
4.3.2 Quasi-expropriatory encroachment
But not only need the German law be adjusted with regard to the rules of tortious
governmental liability (§ 839 BGB in connection with Art.34 GG). Also the rules
concerning quasi-expropriatory encroachment (expropriation-like intrusion) need
to be reconsidered.
In the Brasserie du Pêcheur judgement the BGH denied liability for an
expropriation-like intrusion, reasoning that the requirements for such a claim  were
not satisfied. The German legal system does not recognise a mere opportunity to
sell products on the market as a protected asset185. The mere chance to gain
property is not protected by Art. 14 GG186. Therefore the BGH ruled that the
plaintiff’s property rights which are protected under Art.14 GG were not
infringed.
However the ECJ explicitly stated that “total exclusion of loss of profit as a head
of damage for which reparation may be awarded in the case of a breach of
Community law cannot be accepted. Especially in the context of economic or
commercial litigation, such a total exclusion of loss of profit would be such as to
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make reparation of damage practically impossible.”187 Thus according the
principle of effect utile, losses suffered due to a non-realisation of an opportunity
to sell products, must be recoverable under German law. This results in an
enlargement of the scope pf applicability and enforcement of Art.14 (1) GG.
4.4 Conclusion
German national courts are prevented by their own national laws from awarding
damages, because liability for legislative failure to act is not recognised by German
law188. When a legislature is however bound to comply with particular limits
imposed by superior rules, the state has no reason to deny that it may be bound
to compensate for damage suffered by laws which exceed those national limits189.
Due to the principles of direct effect and supremacy of law, which every Member
State agreed to when joining the European Union, liability for legislative acts is
consistent with the Community legal order and thus should be recognised in every
Member State190.
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5 Ten years after Francovich
Not only will it be necessary to reform Germany’s state liability law. It would also
be a tremendous achievement, if the EC Treaty were to be “reformed” as to deal
with the requirements for liability and compensation directly. Until today, rules and
conditions concerning the question of Member State liability are not codified law,
but result from principles established and developed in decisions by the ECJ.
At this stage the type and amount of damage recoverable are to be determined by
national law. Although Member States have to comply with EC law, damages are
often denied due to national characteristics of a claim for damages.
If state liability rules were to be inherent in the Treaty, national courts would
probably be more willing to apply them, since they would be primary law and not
just principles, established by case law. However the ECJ seems to have taken a
rather reluctant approach concerning a further development of state liability law.
As stated above in its recent judgements concerning state liability, the ECJ
actually authorised the national courts to determine whether there is a sufficiently
serious breach or a causal link between the breach and the damage suffered. Thus
it is probably not very likely that the ECJ will pursue a strict policy concerning the
rules of state liability in the near future.
It appears to be the case that German law is not over generous in the area of state
liability law and that damages are even less likely to be awarded on the basis of
national law than on the basis of Community law. It is furthermore evident that the
Brasserie du Pêcheur judgement allows national courts to avoid awarding
damages against a Member State191. The strictness of the sufficiently serious
breach at the one hand allows national courts to find the Member State not liable.
Some authors even argue that due the fact that compensation depends on the
existence of a sufficiently serious breach of a Community obligation, individuals
are not sufficiently protected192. And on the other hand the application of the
causation test may enable national courts to rule that no liability is incurred193.
Finally reliance on national remedies may permit the national court to restrict the
amount of damages in some way – although not to the extent as to render
reparation impossible or excessively difficult to obtain194.
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Supplement A
Cited norms (paragraphs) from the German Civil Code:
§ 823 BGB195
1. A person who wilfully or negligently injures the life, body, health,
freedom, property, or other right of another contrary to law is bound to
compensate him for any damage arising therefrom.
2. The same obligation attaches to a person who infringes a statutory
provision intended for the protection of others. If according to the
purview of the statute infringement is possible without fault, the duty to
make compensation arises only if some fault can be imputed to the
wrongdoer.
§ 839 BGB196
1. If an official intentionally or negligently violates an official obligation which
he owes to a third party, he is liable for any damage resulting therefrom. If
the official can be blamed merely for negligence he can be sued only if the
injured party is unable to obtain compensation elsewhere.
2. If an official violates his official obligation as regards any judgement
delivered in an action, he is liable for the damage caused thereby only in
so far as his default is in the nature if a criminal offence. This does not
apply to unlawful refusal of or delay in the performance of the official
duty.
3. The liability is excluded if the injured party could have averted such
damage by resorting to available appeal procedures and has wilfully or
negligently failed to do so.
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Supplement B
Cited norms (provisions) from the German Constitution:
Art.14 GG197:
1. Property and the right of inheritance are guaranteed. Their content and
limits shall be determined by the laws.
2. Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public good.
3. Expropriation shall be permitted only for the public good. It may be
carried out only by or pursuant to a law which shall provide for the nature
and extent of the compensation. Such compensation shall be determined
by establishing an equitable balance between the public interest and the
interests if those affected. In case of dispute regarding the amount of
compensation, recourse may be had to the ordinary courts.
Art. 34 GG198:
If any person, in the exercise of a public office entrusted to him, violates his
official obligations to a third party, liability shall lie in principle with the state or the
public body which employs him. In the event of wilful intent or gross negligence
the right of recourse shall be reserved. In respect of the claim for compensation or
the right of recourse, the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts must not be excluded.
Introduction to the Prussian General Land Law of 1794 (EinlALR –
Einleitung zum preußischen Allgemeinen Landrecht)199:
§ 74: The furthering of the common good takes precedence over
individual rights and privileges of the members of the state of a
genuine conflict (collision) exists between these two provisions.
§ 75: The State is, however, bound to compensate anybody who is
forced to sacrifice his particular rights and privileges for the
common good.
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